Privacy Policy
Updated 15 November 2026. This version describes our encrypted backups, the browser extension and where bug reports are kept, and drops a messaging exception that no longer applies. Earlier this month it corrected statements in the August version that no longer matched how Quest works, and added messaging. A fuller policy is being prepared for legal review; if it changes anything material, the change lands here first.
What we store
- Account. Your username, display name and email address, and your sign-in credentials (passkeys, or a password with an authenticator code), held by our own identity service at id.getquest.gg. Your display name and avatar are visible to other people using Quest. If you give a year of birth at sign-up, we store it.
- Your workspace. Goals, boards, canvases, calendar events, Spaces and the links between them, stored in our sync database and access-controlled to your identity at the row level.
- Messages and your Inbox. Rooms and direct messages: what’s sent, who is in each room, and when messages were sent and read. Also the reports you file and the actions taken on them, and your Inbox items (invites, proposals, mentions and replies).
- Life check-ins and diary. Check-ins can record health information: mood, sleep and energy, and, if you turn them on, menstrual cycle, medication, digestion and caffeine. The values and your diary text are end-to-end encrypted (see below).
- Your files. Stored in a namespace that belongs to you alone, encrypted at rest. To search and preview them, we keep the text extracted from your files and a search index.
- Location. If you allow it, the app reads your device’s location to show the weather. Your browser sends the coordinates to Open-Meteo to fetch the forecast, and we store the location with each day’s weather.
- Notifications. If you turn them on, the push address your browser gives us and your browser’s user-agent string.
- Bug reports. What you write, plus your account identifier, device and app details. Unless you leave them out, the last lines of the app’s console log go too, filtered on your device first: only the app’s own diagnostic lines and where errors happened are kept, and identifiers, addresses and values from your encrypted items this device has opened are taken out wherever the filter finds them. You see them before you send. Reports are kept in Quest; we get an email that only points to the report. A report and the Inbox notices about it are deleted 90 days after it’s closed. A demo’s reports are deleted with the demo, 48 hours after it was last used.
- Billing. A Stripe customer reference and your subscription state.
- Server logs. Short account identifiers and, for some actions (starting the demo, pairing a device), your IP address.
Encryption, precisely
- End-to-end encrypted, always: your diary and the values in your life check-ins. They are encrypted on your device with keys only you hold, and we can’t read them.
- End-to-end encrypted by default: messages in rooms and direct messages, with the exceptions below. Only the devices of the people in the room can read them.
- End-to-end encrypted from your first sign-in: the text of your boards, goals, canvases and private calendar events. You make your key the first time you sign in.
- Not end-to-end encrypted: dates, times, positions and colours; calendar events you haven’t marked private; Space notes and activity; your display name and avatar; and your files. Files are encrypted at rest with keys our servers hold, so we could read them; we do so only to index, search and preview them for you.
- Not end-to-end encrypted in messaging: anything sent in a room before its keys are set up; room names; who is in a room; when messages were sent and read; which items were posted into a room; and your Inbox items, which name the sender and the room. A room you export to your vault becomes a file, and is protected as files are.
- Reporting a message: the words you report go to the room’s host and moderators and to Quest’s moderators, even from an encrypted room. That’s how a report can be acted on.
- Moving your key: a new device receives your key from one you already use, after you type a six-digit code. The key passes through our server encrypted, and we can’t read it.
- Backups: every nightly backup is encrypted before it leaves our server, so the server can write backups but can’t read them back. Only recovery keys that we hold apart from the server open them. Your file bytes aren’t in these backups; they are protected as files are, above.
- The AI companion: when you ask it something, the content it reads is decrypted on your device and sent through our server to an AI provider. It isn’t end-to-end encrypted on that journey.
The security page has the detail.
The AI companion
The companion is an AI, not a person, and its answers can be wrong; check anything important. It reads your workspace to answer what you ask. When it looks at a day, that includes your mood, sleep, energy and expectation check-ins. Cycle, medication, digestion and caffeine are included only if you turn on sharing for each one in Account → Companion.
Some jobs run without a new question from you. When a conversation goes quiet or closes, the companion distils notes into its memory and gives the thread a title, and it attaches relevant memory to later requests. Its conversations and memory are saved as files in your vault, where you can delete them.
Which model answers depends on the job and on the brain tier you choose in Account → Companion. Our AI subprocessors are: Anthropic (planning, safeguards, card minting, and reading documents with page citations, sent directly); and, through OpenRouter (our model router), Meta (Muse Spark: reading and tutoring), Together AI / Fireworks AI (US hosts running the open-weight GLM models: chat on the Open tier, titles, memory distillation), Cerebras (running the open-weight gpt-oss model: formatting, search rewrites, and judging which vault passages answer your question), and Google (Gemini Flash on Google Cloud: plain chat on the Open tier). When you ask the companion to search or read the web, that runs through Anthropic’s web tools.
None of these providers may train on your requests. Every request through OpenRouter carries its no-training setting. Providers may keep requests for a limited time to detect abuse: Anthropic deletes API data within 30 days and keeps content flagged for a policy violation for up to 2 years; Google keeps flagged prompts for up to 90 days. Free-tier and consumer subscriptions are never used.
If you bring your own API key (Anthropic or OpenRouter), your requests go from your device to that provider under your own agreement with them, not through our server.
The browser extension
Squire for Quest is an optional browser extension for Chrome and Firefox. It saves a paper to your Library, or archives a web page. It does nothing in the background: it reads a page only when you open it from the toolbar on that page. It has permission to reach any site.
- What it reads. When you open it, from the page in front of you: the address, the title, any DOI and PDF link the page names in its own markup, and the page’s HTML (up to 4 MB), which stays in your browser until you press Archive. When you press Save to Library, it fetches the paper’s PDF from the publisher’s own site, using your sign-in to that site.
- What it sends to Quest. To pair, it asks our sign-in service (auth.getquest.gg) for a short code, then checks whether you approved it, and gives our vault (vault.getquest.gg) a name such as “Chrome on Mac”. After that it sends the vault, with its own device credential: the PDF when you press Save; the page’s address and HTML when you press Archive; and file names, sizes and types to put the result in the Library/Inbox or Library/Archive folders of your vault. When you press Save it also opens Quest in a new tab, with the DOI in the address. Quest keeps what you send as it keeps your other files and Library records. The extension sends nothing else.
- What it keeps on your device. In the browser’s extension storage: the three Quest addresses, its device credential and device name, and a pairing code while one is waiting. You can revoke the credential in Account → File Vault, or forget the pairing in the extension.
- Two other services. On an OSF preprint page (PsyArXiv, SocArXiv and other sites on osf.io), opening the extension asks OSF’s API (api.osf.io) for that preprint’s DOI and PDF link, under OSF’s own privacy policy. And when you archive a page, our server asks the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine to capture it. The Archive fetches the page itself from the open web and never receives your copy of it, and its capture is public and permanent.
- Nothing else. It has no analytics and loads no remote code.
Google Calendar
If you connect Google Calendar, we access your calendar list, the events in the “Quest” calendar we create in your Google account, and the email address of your Google account. If you run an import, we also read events in the calendars you choose and, if you choose to move them, delete the originals. We use this data only to sync your calendar and to run imports you ask for. Calendar content goes to an AI provider only when you ask the companion about it. Your Google credentials are encrypted on our server. Disconnecting deletes them and revokes our access.
Quest’s use and transfer of information received from Google APIs will adhere to the Google API Services User Data Policy, including the Limited Use requirements. We don’t use Google user data to develop, improve or train generalised AI or machine-learning models.
Who else handles your data
Your data is stored in Australia: in Sydney, with encrypted backups in Melbourne. These services handle parts of it, and some of them process it in the United States or elsewhere:
- DigitalOcean: hosts our servers and stores your encrypted file bytes (Sydney).
- Amazon Web Services: holds an encrypted off-site copy of our nightly backups, in Melbourne. It can’t read them.
- Stripe and Link: payments (see below).
- Resend: sends our email: sign-up codes, password resets, invites, account notices, bug reports and your daily Inbox digest. The digest names senders and rooms; it includes message text only from messages that weren’t end-to-end encrypted.
- The AI providers above: the companion.
- Google: calendar sync, if you connect it.
- Your browser’s push service (Google, Mozilla, Apple or Microsoft): delivers notifications; it sees the push address and timing, not the content.
- Open-Meteo: weather, contacted directly by your browser.
- OpenAlex and Crossref: searches and references you look up in the Library.
- Internet Archive: when you archive a page, in the Library or with the browser extension, it makes a public, permanent copy of that page.
- OSF: the browser extension asks its API about a preprint when you open the extension on an OSF preprint page.
- Apple: in the desktop app, place names you enter for travel times.
- Zotero: only if you connect it with your own key, directly from your browser.
Payments
Purchases are sold through Link, LLC, a Stripe affiliate, which is the merchant of record. Stripe and Link collect your payment and billing details under their own privacy policy. We receive a customer reference, your subscription status and limited transaction details. Card numbers never touch our servers.
What we never do
- No third-party trackers, analytics scripts or ad pixels, on this site or in the app. This site loads no third-party scripts, fonts or CDNs; its only JavaScript is a few inline snippets (theme, scroll animation) readable in the page source.
- No selling or sharing of your data. There are no advertising partners.
- No using your workspace to build profiles, for advertising, or to train AI models. Our servers read the parts of your workspace that aren’t end-to-end encrypted only to provide features: syncing your calendar, serving your calendar feed, and indexing your files.
Sessions
Access tokens are held in memory, not in localStorage. The exceptions: a token that lets you resume the demo (48 hours), and your own AI key if you choose to remember it on this device. A signed, HttpOnly, same-site refresh cookie lets your session resume after a reload, for up to 30 days. Signing out revokes it at once; other access tokens expire within 2 hours. A paired desktop app or browser extension keeps its own credential on that device. Signing out doesn’t revoke it; deleting your account does.
Deleting and exporting your data
- Deleting your account: Account → Privacy → Delete account. It needs a recent sign-in. Your access ends at once, and your data is permanently deleted 14 days later. Signing back in during those 14 days cancels the deletion.
- Trash: deleted files stay in trash for 30 days; their storage is freed 7 days after that.
- Backups: nightly backups are kept on our server for 14 days. The off-site copy is locked for 12 days, then removed within about two more. Deleted data leaves the backups within about 14 days of being purged. The file store keeps old versions of deleted files for 14 days; it has no off-site copy.
- Your messages: deleting your account removes your messages from our servers for everyone, along with the rooms you own.
- What deletion doesn’t reach: Stripe keeps payment records under its own policy; Library records shared across users and Internet Archive copies stay; our email provider and AI providers keep their own limited records as described above. Messages other people read stay on their devices and in anything they exported. Reports other people filed keep the words they reported, and we haven’t set a time limit on those yet.
- Exporting: a one-click export isn’t built yet. You can download any file, and the Quest Vault desktop app keeps your whole vault as a folder on your Mac. For a copy of anything else, email us.
Changes
If this policy changes, the change lands here with a new “updated” date before it takes effect.
Contact
Questions about this policy, or requests about your data: hello@getquest.gg.