Security & privacy

This page describes the system as it is built — including the parts that are not end-to-end encrypted yet. If a claim here stops being true, the page changes.

The ledger

Life check-ins & diary E2EE, always

Check-in values and diary text are AES-256-GCM encrypted on your device with keys only you hold. Without your keys the app refuses to write them at all — there is no plaintext mode. When you ask the companion about a day, your device decrypts the mood, sleep, energy and expectation readings and sends them to the AI provider; other trackers only if you turn sharing on.

Boards, goals, canvas text E2EE, from first sign-in

Task titles, board and column names, goal titles, canvas labels and card bodies, and private calendar events encrypt on-device with the key you make at your first sign-in (Account → Security). The honest edges are listed below.

Files in your vault Encrypted at rest

XChaCha20 envelope per object — a fresh data key for every file, wrapped by a master key. Thumbnails go through the identical seal. Honest caveat: the master keys are server-held today, so files are encrypted but not zero-knowledge; a ZK tier is designed.

Backups Nightly, encrypted, off-site

Nightly backups, kept for 14 days. Each is encrypted before it leaves our server, to two recovery keys we hold apart from it, so the server can write backups but cannot read them back. A signed manifest lets a restore catch a forged run. A second copy goes to a separate cloud account in Melbourne under a lock that neither the server nor we can shorten for 12 days. A full restore onto a fresh server was performed end-to-end in August, before backups were encrypted; the encrypted runs have since been checked by decrypting them with each recovery key. Your file bytes are not in these backups: they are encrypted at rest, the file store keeps old versions of deleted files for 14 days, and it has no off-site copy yet.

Auth tokens Memory + revocable cookie

Access tokens live in memory, not localStorage. A signed HttpOnly same-site refresh cookie resumes your session; signing out revokes it immediately, and remaining access tokens expire within two hours.

This website No third-party code

No trackers, no analytics, no ad pixels, no font CDNs, nothing loaded from third parties. The only JavaScript is a handful of tiny inline snippets — theme, scroll animations, docs navigation — all readable in the page source.

Your files: encrypted, versioned, yours

Every file in the vault is envelope-encrypted at rest: a fresh XChaCha20 key per object, wrapped by a named master key, stored in a namespace that belongs to you alone. Reads are verified against content hashes, so silent corruption is detected rather than served. Images are stripped of EXIF/XMP metadata on ingest.

Versions are immutable — restoring is a pointer flip, not a copy — so your history is auditable and reversible. Deleted files sit in trash for 30 days; their storage is freed 7 days after that.

Deleting your account deletes your vault 14 days after you ask — sign back in within that window to cancel. A one-click export isn't built yet; until it is, download any file, or keep the whole vault on your Mac with Quest Vault.

And the vault isn't locked in the browser: Quest Vault for desktop keeps it as a real folder on your machine — offline-first, delta-synced, with concurrent edits forked visibly instead of clobbered. Devices pair with a short code and hold their own revocable credential; the app never sees your password.

Structured data: end-to-end encrypted, with honest edges

Since July 2026, the text of your boards, goals and canvases encrypts on your device before it syncs — the server stores ciphertext it cannot read. One thing you should know, because you would find out anyway: you make your key at your first sign-in, so it covers everything you write from then on; content in an account made before November 2026 stays server-readable until the migration affordance ships. And the coverage has edges we list rather than blur: calendar events you haven't marked private, Space notes and activity, and your display name and avatar are not end-to-end encrypted, and metadata that makes sync work — dates, positions, colours — never is. Life check-ins and diary text are stricter: always encrypted, no plaintext mode, writes refuse without keys. One path leaves the encryption by design: when you ask the companion something, the content it reads is decrypted on your device and sent through our server to the AI provider named on the reply. Underneath all of it, the same access controls hold for everything:

  • Row-level security on the sync layer. Every table is filtered server-side to your identity — a subscription cannot be crafted to read another user's rows.
  • Owner-guarded writes. Every mutation verifies the caller owns what it touches, in the module, not in the UI.
  • Identity derived from claims. Your database identity is cryptographically derived from the auth token's issuer and subject — there is no anonymous write path.

The key model: a recovery key only you hold unwraps your root key (600k-iteration PBKDF2), which is kept in the browser on each of your devices. Set up, unlock, or forget a device in Account & Security, or move the key to a new device with a six-digit code. One consequence stated plainly: encrypted containers can't be shared with other people yet; per-recipient key wrapping is designed, not shipped.

Identity and sessions

Sign-in is OIDC against our own identity service (at id.getquest.gg) with ES256-signed tokens. Access tokens are held in memory only — never localStorage — and a signed HttpOnly refresh cookie resumes your session across reloads; signing out revokes it immediately. There is no Google sign-in: Google appears only if you connect Google Calendar.

No surveillance

No third-party trackers, no analytics scripts, no ad pixels, no external font or CDN requests — on this site or in the app. This site loads nothing from third parties; its only JavaScript is a few inline snippets you can read in the page source. In the app, a few features you choose talk to outside services — the weather, push notifications, Library lookups; the privacy policy lists every one.

What's still open

Honesty cuts both ways, so the current edge list: there is no off-site copy of the file bytes yet; there is no one-click export yet; room names and who is in a room aren't end-to-end encrypted; content created before key setup has no migration affordance yet; encrypted containers can't be shared; and the vault's zero-knowledge tier is designed, not shipped. This page tracks each as it lands — transport encryption everywhere, encrypted off-site backups and field encryption for card bodies, sub-goal titles, project names and comments already did.

Want to go deeper?

Everything above is the plain-language version, and it's the whole truth — nothing important is hidden behind jargon. But if you're an engineer (or just curious) and want the mechanism — how identity is derived, how row-level security is enforced, the vault's exact envelope format, the threat model — read the docs.